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Abstract—5G-enabled drones have potential applications in a
variety of both military and civilian settings (e.g., monitoring
and tracking of individuals in demonstrations and/or enforc-
ing of social / physical distancing during pandemics such as
COVID-19). Such applications generally involve the collection
and dissemination of (massive) data from the drones to remote
data centres for storage and analysis, for example via 5G
networks. Consequently, there are security and privacy consid-
erations underpinning 5G-enabled drone communications. We
posit the potential of leveraging blockchain to facilitate privacy
preservation, and therefore in this article we will review existing
blockchain-based solutions after introducing the architecture for
5G-enabled drone communications and blockchain. We will also
review existing legislation and data privacy regulations that need
to be considered in the design of blockchain-based solutions, as
well as identifying potential challenges and open issues which
will hopefully inform future research agenda.
Index Terms—Drones, 5G, Blockchain, Privacy Preservation,
Legislation and Data Privacy Regulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Drones (also referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles in the
literature) are gaining popularity in a wide spectrum of tasks,
ranging from military settings (e.g., reconnaissance and obser-
vation) to civilian scenarios (e.g., supporting search and rescue
operations, monitoring weather and traffic flows, delivering
goods, aerial photography and civilian monitoring and surveil-
lance to enforce stay-at-home or social / physical distancing
orders, for example during pandemics such as COVID-19), and
so on [1]. Generally in these tasks, massive volume of data are
collected and transferred to remote data centres for storage and
analysis; thus, resulting in potential security and privacy chal-
lenges for both individuals and businesses. Individual privacy
violations, for example, include being the subject of a targeted,
but unauthorised (i.e., non-court approved) surveillance or
some general-purpose aerial photography activities. There are
also potential national security implications associated with
drone activities, for example using drones to take pictures and
videos of key military / sensitive installations.
The fifth generation (5G) mobile communication system
has been deployed in many countries, such as Australia, US,
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UK and China, to support a wide range of applications with
diversified requirements (e.g., ultra-high bandwidth, ultra-low
latency and ultra-high reliability). A swarm of 5G-enabled
drones, coordinating and collaborating with each other, can
form a web of networking, computing and storage resources
in the sky. These flying resources facilitate sensing, analysing,
and transmitting of collected data, particularly for drones
equipped with high definition cameras and 5G-enabled com-
munication modules [2]. These drones can also work with
other 5G components (e.g., edge computing servers) to en-
hance their computing and storage capabilities. There are,
however, underlying privacy considerations associated with the
data collection, handling, storage and analysis.
Privacy breaches can be examined from two perspectives.
First, drones if controlled by a malicious user or successfully
compromised and taken over by a malicious user, can be
easily (ab)used as a surveillance device to track and/or monitor
individuals. Efficient authentication of controlling drones is,
therefore, an important factor to minimise privacy breaches.
Second, the transparency of data handling also requires further
study. For example, many countries have their own data
protection regulations, such as the General Data Protection
Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) used by countries in the Euro-
pean Union and the European Economic Area. Under GDPR,
personal private data need to be handled in the way agreed by
the data owner. Ensuring the transparency of data handling is
crucial in ensuring compliance with data protection regulation
and minimising privacy breaches. There have been attempts
to leverage blockchain to facilitate privacy preservation, as we
will explain in this article.
In this paper, we will introduce the architecture for 5G-
enabled drone communications, and briefly review the work-
ings of blockchain and how it can facilitate privacy preserva-
tion (see Sections II and III, respectively). Then, in Section IV,
we will review blockchain-based solutions that can be adopted
for 5G-enabled drone communications to minimise privacy
breaches. In Section V, we will revisit existing legislation
and data privacy regulations that need to be considered in the
design of blockchain-based solutions. Finally, potential chal-
lenges and open issues associated with privacy preservation
for 5G-enabled drone communications will be discussed.
II. 5G-ENABLED DRONE COMMUNICATIONS
In 5G-enabled drone communications, drones typically act
in two capacities, namely: 5G base stations/relays and 5G
users [3]. Existing drones can be equipped with a lightweight
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Fig. 1. Three typical scenarios in 5G-enabled drone communications: (a) Using 5G base station drones to enhance 5G communication capacity, (b) Using
5G user drones to draw a map in a drone-to-drone (D2D) cooperative way, and (c) Using a combination of both 5G base station drones and 5G user drones
to perform search and rescue in a wildfire.
base station or a relay. In other words, they become 5G base
station/relay drones that facilitate terrestrial wireless commu-
nications. Such settings can be deployed in many different
5G application scenarios, such as at events (e.g., concerts)
where spikes in traffic are expected only during certain times,
and natural disasters (e.g., forest / bush fires) where there is
no supporting infrastructure or the infrastructure is damaged.
In addition, drones that act as 5G base stations/relays usually
provide more reliable line-of-sight (LoS) connection links with
their ground users compared with their terrestrial counterparts.
Drones can also be the users of 5G systems, in order to
leverage the features of 5G systems (e.g., ubiquitous coverage,
low-latency and high-bandwidth). In such a setting, drones are
controlled by ground stations to perform the allocated tasks.
In addition, device-to-device communications in 5G systems
allow drones to communicate with each other in an ad-hoc
manner without the need of an (expensive) infrastructure. For
example, drones can swiftly form a web of flying resources
at the region in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, pro-
viding the necessary communication, storage and computing
resources to facilitate activities such as rescue and search.
In addition to the above two broad scenarios, drones can also
play the role of both 5G base stations/relays and users in the
same deployment, as demonstrated in Fig. 1. Drones in the
first two scenarios generally collect and/or produce massive
volume of data, including sensitive (e.g., videos or images
relating to a key installation or suspects). Consequently, this
raises the issues of who can legitimately access the data (and
how to enforce such access control), and how to protect the
privacy of the data.
A. Potential Privacy Concerns
As previously discussed, privacy is an ongoing concern [4].
In deployments where drones are the 5G base stations/relays
(e.g., in public safety or crowd control situations, such as
demonstrations or riots), the collected (sensitive) data can be
targeted by (politically or issue-motivated) attackers seeking
to exfiltrate the data. When drones are 5G users (e.g., in
civilian monitoring and surveillance), attackers may seek to
compromise and take over control of the drones and used them
for nefarious purposes (e.g., as weapons to carry out attacks
against the crowd [5]). Data acquired by other drones in the
vicinity could be eavesdropped by these compromised drones,
for example by abusing device-to-device communications.
III. BLOCKCHAIN FOR PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Blockchain is a decentralised distributed ledger database
system, which contains cryptographically generated data
blocks, where each block comprises a series of transactions
approved by the majority of the participants in the system [6].
Blocks are chained together (hence, the name “blockchain”)
in a linear fashion and in a chronological order. Each block
possesses a hash of its previous block (recorded in the block
header), which is used as the unique identification of the block.
The hash value in a block is the hash value of its parent block,
and a block in the blockchain can therefore be found through
the hash value of its parent block. A chain with the linked list
data structure, as shown in Fig. 2, is formed by the hash value
sequence of each block linked from the last generated one to
the genesis one.
Genesis block Block 1 Block 2
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Fig. 2. A blockchain typical structure.
The following characteristics of blockchain can be utilized
to facilitate privacy preservation:
• Transparency. Each participant in the blockchain system
can hold a copy of the blockchain; thus, allowing each
participant to verify whether a transaction is initiated by
a legitimate user.
• Temper-proof. Each block is added to the blockchain
through the confirmation by a consensus algorithm, which
undergoes a verification process of blocks where all
participants can take part in. The blockchain system,
3therefore, maintains a tamper-proof ledger shared by the
participants without relying on a trusted third party.
• Security. Blockchain utilizes asymmetric cryptographic
building blocks to encrypt data, whose security generally
relies on the underpinning consensus algorithm (empow-
ered by the majority of the participants).
Smart contracts [7] are a key component of blockchain,
enabling self-execution of a program when certain terms are
met. Hence, they can be used to facilitate automated privacy
preservation.
IV. REVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PRIVACY
PRESERVATION SOLUTIONS
We now present blockchain-based solutions for privacy
preservation in 5G-enabled drone communications, in terms of
ID management, data privacy protection, trajectory protection
and the consensus of drone networks.
A. Blockchain-based Identification Management of Drones
Achieving effective and efficient identification (ID) manage-
ment of drones is crucial as they are becoming increasingly
commonplace. The importance of ID management is also
reinforced by the guideline entitled “Remote ID Notice of
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) for drone ID management”1
introduced by U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
However, centralised ID management can incur significant
administrative costs (e.g., due to bureaucracy) and have other
limitations such as single point of failure / attack. Hence,
there have been interests to explore the utility of blockchain in
designing decentralised ID management systems, in order to
simplify the ID management process and lower the administra-
tion costs. In a robust blockchain-based system, for example,
a drone can register and/or revoke any expired ID in the
decentralised blockchain-based ID management systems. In
addition, blockchain-based systems are tamper-proof, achieve
non-repudiation, and minimise the single point of failure
/ attack risk. In addition, blockchains can also ensure the
anonymity of drones, since drones only use the generated
addresses to interact with each other in the system.
The blockchain-based ID management of drones can cover
the entire life cycle of a drone, which consists of six main
stages (including the three marked active stages) as shown
in Fig. 3(a). In particular, a drone can register its ID in the
decentralised blockchain-based ID management system since
the date of production (i.e., Creation). During this process, the
trust can be ensured via decentralised consensus of blockchain-
based systems. A post-flight inspection needs to be performed
after every flight (i.e., Drone in service), as well as some
maintenance or repairing tasks. Due to fatigue or attrition,
a drone will terminate its service after a number of flights
(i.e., Termination). The termination status will be updated in
the blockchain so that the drone ID can be either revoked
or removed. For example, a lost or damaged drone also
needs to be reported and recorded in the blockchain-based ID
1https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/12/31/2019-
28100/remote-identification-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems
management system. In summary, during the entire life cycle
of a drone, the status changes of a drone can be traceable via
the blockchain-based ID management system.
As discussed earlier, smart contracts can automate the drone
ID management process. For example, conditions or terms
of drone services can be written into contractual clauses
in computer programs. When some conditions reach (e.g.,
a drone is revoked), the actions (corresponding to program
statements) will be automatically triggered and executed (e.g.,
the drone becoming inactive). In this way, the drone ID
management process can be simplified and the corresponding
administrative cost can be reduced.
B. Blockchain-based Data Privacy Protection of Drones
As mentioned above, data can be collected by or (tem-
porarily) stored in the drones (e.g., when drones act as 5G
base stations, relays, or users). Such data can be of interest to
attackers, who may seek to exfiltrate data stored or cached at
these drones using a malicious / compromised drone, either via
drone-to-drone (D2D) link or by drone-to-ground (D2G) link
as shown in Fig. 3(b). In addition, data-in-transit (from drone
to base station) via the drone-to-base-station (D2B) link can
potentially be intercepted or wiretapped by a malicious user.
There is also the risk that the base station may be targeted.
This reinforces the importance of both security and privacy
preservation of user data in drone communications.
Blockchain can play different roles in ensuring data privacy
of drone communications. First, blockchain-based authentica-
tion mechanisms can verify whether an access request initiated
from a drone is authorised. We remark that the authentication
mechanisms should be fully integrated with blockchain-based
ID management systems, with appropriate access control set-
tings. To minimise the risk of data being misused at either the
drones or the base stations, blockchain-based cryptographic
schemes can be utilized [8], such as asymmetric encryption
algorithms and homomorphic obfuscations. Third, blockchain-
based encryption schemes across the entire network stack (e.g.,
physical, link and network layers) can also be deployed to
mitigate threats at D2D, D2G and D2B links [9]. Furthermore,
the adoption of blockchain can preserve the privacy of cache
content and ensure trust among multiple parties as explained
in [10].
In addition to data privacy protection, we also need to ensure
efficient management of drone data (e.g., both blockchain data
and user data). In particular, public blockchain systems are
known to have massive blockchain data volume, e.g., Bitcoin
contains more than 240GB data as of 2019. It is impractical to
store the entire blockchain data at drones, even for higher-end
drones with a larger storage capacities. Therefore, drones may
only store user data, such as data from other Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices, and potentially partial blockchain data (e.g.,
hash values of blockchain transactions for verification pur-
pose). Ground or base stations may store the entire blockchain
data. Other than data storage challenges, there are also latency
and bandwidth challenges associated with the massive data
size. Hence, it becomes an essential to preprocess the data
at drones since user data, especially IoT data, may contain
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Fig. 3. Blockchain-based Privacy Preservation for Drone Communications
duplicates, errors and noises. The miniaturisation of high-
performance computing facilities and the rapid development
of embedding devices can help us meet this emerging demand.
In other words, drones may serve as edge computing nodes
to complement remote clouds and collaborate with other edge
computing nodes deployed at base stations.
C. Blockchain-based Trajectory Privacy Protection
The trajectory information of drones is crucial to facilitate
and enforce control, route planning and navigation during
adverse weather conditions or natural disasters. However, the
trajectory information of drones is vulnerable to malicious
attacks, as shown in Fig. 3(c). In addition, centralised trajec-
tory information management is susceptible to single point of
failure / attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and privacy
breaches. For example, drones can be tracked, intercepted
and even hijacked once the trajectories of drones are exposed
to malicious users. Moreover, the behaviours of drone users
can be tracked and inferred by analysing the trajectories of
drones. Such data can also be used to facilitate other nefarious
activities, such as stalking.
Similar to the earlier discussion, blockchain-based authen-
tication and access control mechanisms can used to authorise
access permissions of users to the drone trajectory data. Again,
the integration of blockchain-based trajectory management
with blockchain-based ID management and blockchain-based
data management is crucial. Second, the decentralisation of
blockchain-based drone trajectory management systems can
also mitigate the risks of single point of failure / attacks
associated with centralised systems. Moreover, incorporat-
ing other trajectory privacy-preservation schemes (e.g., k-
anonymity scheme) can better improve the trajectory privacy
protection of drones.
D. Blockchain-based Consensus of Drone Networks
In some real-world scenarios (e.g., monitoring crowd move-
ments in a demonstration), multiple drones may collaborate
together to complete a complex task. In this case, one task
is divided into a number of sub-tasks, each of which is
completed by a drone. During this process, it is crucial to
ensure a reliable drone network that can coordinate between
multiple drones. However, it can be extremely challenging to
maintain a dependable network due to the dynamic topology of
drone networks, unreliable wireless communications between
drones, and the potential of drones to be compromised or
attacked [11]. Take Fig. 3(d) as an example, a malicious
drone may be disguised as a legitimate drone to join the
drone network so as to carry out malicious activities such
as disrupting the drone network or wiretapping private data
transmission between drones.
How can blockchain play a role here? First, blockchain-
based ID management system can be used to identify non-
member drones by analysing and tracking ID updating histor-
ical records. Second, the consensus mechanisms (e.g., Proof
of Work and Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance [12]) in
blockchain can help the majority of legitimate drones to be
resistant to malicious attacks, such as Sybil attack. Third,
the consensus of drone networks can significantly raise the
cost of counterfeiting a fake drone or several fake drones;
consequently, mitigating falsification risks. Moreover, the in-
centive mechanisms in blockchain systems can be leveraged
to motivate drones into participating in the consensus of drone
networks. Instead of employing digital currencies as the direct
5incentive, reputation credits might be more suitable in the
drone network scenario.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS IN DRONE
COMMUNICATIONS
No. Drone Communications Blockchain solutions
1 Drone ID management Transparency, temper-proof,
traceability
2 Data privacy protection Asymmetric encryption algo-
rithms, homomorphic obfusca-
tions
3 Trajectory privacy Authentication and access con-
trol schemes
4 Consensus of drone networks Fault-tolerance, traceability,
anti-falsification
Blockchain is not, however, a panacea for drone security
and privacy. For example, many consensus algorithms of
existing blockchains have low efficiency and incur significant
resource overheads. Such limitations may limit the adoption of
blockchain in drone networks. Directed acyclic graph (DAG),
sharding blockchain consensus, off-chain blockchain data are
possible solutions to these challenges. In particular, DAG
accepts the non-conflict side-chain so as to reduce the cost,
while the sharding consensus only requires a subset of nodes
(corresponding to drones) to participate in the consensus
procedure and multiple subsets (or committees) can then reach
consensus. Consequently, consensus efficiency can be greatly
improved. In addition, off-chain strategies allow transactions to
be conducted without the involvement of the main blockchain,
and all these transactions can be eventually stored as a new
block to the main blockchain.
Table I summarises the blockchain-based solutions in 5G
drone communications.
V. PRIVACY-RELATED LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS
Similar to other technologies, drone-related regulations
generally lag behind research and development advances in
drones. For example, Sto¨cker et al. [13] presented a com-
prehensive review of the status of drone-related regulations
as of 2017. The surveys of Fotouhi et al. [14] and Ullah et
al. [15] also discussed recent developments in drone-related
regulations and standardisation. In this section, we focus on
the regulatory and standardisation advances relating to privacy
preservation in drone communications.
Public privacy, safety, and data protection are the key fo-
cuses in the majority of legislative efforts [13], for example to
protect individuals, environment, and objects from the various
harms (e.g., physical safety and intrusion of private space)
associated with drones. While regulations may differ between
jurisdictions, existing regulations tend to have clear definitions
of no-fly zones, the need to maintain a safe distance from
human crowds and prohibit the flying of drones over human
crowds, the need for training and certification of pilots who fly
drones over a defined weight limit, flying below a maximum
flying height, and liabilities in the event of an incident.
Examples of recently released regulations include the EU
Commission Delegated Regulations 2019/945 (EU2019/945) 2
and EU2019/947 3, which are scheduled to be fully enforced
on July 1 of 2020. These regulations cover the design, man-
ufacture, and operation of drones, and has implications to
manufacturers, importers, and distributors. In addition, the new
regulations clarify on the technical requirements of drones in
different classes.
Another recent popular topic in the drone industry is the
so-called Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, which
can cover larger areas (including areas that are difficult or
impossible for the pilots to keep an eye on). BVLOS flights
can be deployed in adversarial and rough conditions, such as
battlefields, inspection of key installations (e.g., oil and gas
pipelines, power grids, and border control) and wild life, and
search and rescue operations. However, there are also greater
risky or ill-intentioned use in the operating of BVLOS flights,
which may explain why they are generally not allowed in
many countries. For example, the U.S. does not allow BVLOS
flights, without a waiver from the relevant authority4. However,
regulations on BVLOS flights are evolving at a very fast
pace. An amendment5 to EU2019/947 w.r.t. BVLOS flights
is currently in progress, at the time of writing. We expect
that the BVLOS flights will become better regulated across
different countries in the near future, and it is an important
aspect to consider when we study privacy preservation issues
for drones.
Standards bodies have also been very proactive in drone-
related activities. For example, the technical specification TS
22.125 of 3GPP6 “identifies the requirements for operation of
UAVs via the 3GPP system”. The 3GPP Release 16 includes
“requirements for meeting the business, security, and public
safety needs for the remote identification and tracking of Un-
manned Aerial System (UAS) linked to a 3GPP subscription”.
In the 3GPP Release 17 (scheduled for delivery in 2021), it
includes 5G enhancement for UAVs.
As observed by Sto¨cker et al. [13], an increase in drone
activities will also result in additional administrative processes,
such as those relating to flight registration and approval. We
believe that the decentralisation of blockchain systems is a
viable approach to reducing administrative redtapes.
ID of drones has been one of the main artefacts to ensure
traceability and accountability. In the new EU rules, with the
exception of class C0 (less than 250g), all classes must bear a
unique physical serial number and more importantly a direct
remote ID “allowing the upload of the operator registration
2Council of European Union, Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU)2019/945 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0945.
3Council of European Union, Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2019/947 on the rules and procedures for the operation
of unmanned aircraft, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0947.
4It is reportedly very difficult to obtain such a waiver in the U.S.. For exam-
ple, as of June 8, 2020, only 54 BVLOS (107.31) waivers have been issued, ac-
cording to https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial operators/part 107 waivers/
5https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/NPA%202020-07.pdf
6TS 22.125 Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) support in 3GPP, 2019 https:
//www.3gpp.org/uas-uav
6number and in real time during the whole duration of the
flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA (unmanned
aircraft) using an open and documented transmission protocol
in a way that they can be received directly by existing mobile
devices within the broadcasting range”. On the other hand,
TS 22.125 of 3GPP further elaborates that “The 3GPP system
shall enable UAV to preserve the privacy of the owner of
the UAV, UAV pilot, and the UAV operator in its broadcast
of identity information”. From these recent developments in
regulations, it is clear that auditability and anonymity features
due to the use of blockchain can facilitate traceability and
accountability of drones.
On data privacy protection, we can look at two aspects.
First, the privacy of people, environment, and objects that
may be intruded by drones, and second, the protection of
legitimate data collected by drones and the communication
privacy between the drone and the pilot. As mentioned earlier,
the first aspect has been the focus of recent legislative changes.
However, in practice it can be difficult to enforce. The sensory
range of onboard sensors is constantly improving due to
technology advancement. This compounds the challenge of
tracking and identification, especially for smaller drones. The
direct remote ID and the geo-awareness system required by
EU2019/945 for drones in some classes are helpful in this
aspect, so further exploration is necessary. The second aspect
is also partially covered by EU2019/945, since drones in
some classes are required to “be equipped with a data link
protected against unauthorised access to the command and
control functions” and TS 22.125 of 3GPP states that “3GPP
system shall support the capability to provide different levels
of integrity and privacy protection for the different connections
between UAS and UTM (UAS Traffic Management) as well
as the data being transferred via those connections”.
Table II presents a brief summary of regulations by selected
representative countries7, in terms of privacy preservation. Re-
call that the new EU regulations EU2019/945 and EU2019/947
will be fully enforced on July 1 of 2020. Therefore, existing
national regulations are in the process of being harmonised
with or superseded by the new EU rules. The communication
privacy on drones are largely not mentioned by the national
regulations listed in Table II. In other words, the new EU
regulations and the 3GPP standards are more advanced in this
aspect.
VI. RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES
Despite the potential benefits of blockchain in drone com-
munication privacy preservation, there remain a number of
open challenges which will be discussed next.
• Resource constraints of drones: Most existing drones are
resource-limited, in terms of energy, size and weight con-
siderations. Encryption and/or consensus algorithms are
generally required for blockchain systems, yet drones are
generally incapable of computing-intensive tasks due to
7These countries are selected because they are representative of the most
advanced development in drone regulations from different continents. Sto¨cker
et al. [13] also studied these countries in their comparative analysis, with the
exception of the new EU regulations EU2019/945 and EU2019/947.
computationally constraints and battery life. In addition, a
swarm of UAVs can generate and/or collect gigabytes of
data per second, including both audio and video. Whether
the storage capacity of blockchain can accommodate such
high volume of data is still debatable, and whether and
how to incorporate other storage resources (e.g., edge
servers) with the UAV system remains an open chal-
lenge. Apart from these, drones are energy constrained
devices, and thus they need energy efficient solutions.
However, miners (i.e., drones) consume a disproportion-
ate amount of electricity when generating blocks; thus,
existing drones may not be capable of supporting suffi-
cient energy required for mining of blocks. In the future,
the orchestration of various computing facilities such as
remote clouds, nearby edge servers and drones, and other
technologies such as network coding, becomes a necessity
to implement blockchain-based drone communications.
• Full privacy preservation of drone data: In blockchain-
based solutions for drone networks, each drone requires
to store a copy of the data blocks (i.e., distributed ledger).
This risks the dissemination of sensitive information to all
participating drones. Although blockchain can guarantee
certain level of privacy preservation of drone data, activ-
ities of both users of drone communications and drones
can be inferred (or extracted) via statistical analysis or
using other machine learning tools. For example, user
private data relayed through drones may be leaked to
malicious users who may compromise the drones with the
aim of exfiltrating data. How to fully ensure data privacy
of drone communications is still an open research ques-
tion. Limiting the information sharing between drones is
one potential solution, although this may not be practical
in some applications.
• Scalability of blockchain-based drone networks: Multiple
drones can form a drone network for diverse tasks. As
discussed earlier, the consensus of drone networks can
help to mitigate the falsification of malicious drones and
other security risks. However, it is challenging to achieve
a scalable blockchain-based drone network due to the
dynamics of drones (i.e., drones can join and leave at
any time) as well as the scalability constraints of current
blockchain systems (i.e., low throughput of transactions
per second). For example, poor scalability may lead to
the difficulty of forming a drone network and reaching a
consensus when a new drone joins. Therefore, scalability
of blockchain-based drone networks is an important issue
to explore in the future.
• Remote identification: As mentioned earlier, new regula-
tions require drones to periodically broadcast their ID in-
formation that can be directly received by existing mobile
devices within the broadcasting range. Such an activity
needs to be conducted without violating the privacy of the
owner, the pilot, and the operator. Designing an efficient
solution for remote ID requires an in-depth understanding
of the data transmission protocols and the various security
and privacy risks (including emerging risks), and hence
remains one of ongoing interest.
• Regulation development and compliance enforcement:
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COMPARISON OF DRONE-RELATED REGULATIONS IN TERMS OF PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Country Data Privacy on Drones Communication Privacy on Drones
EU 2019/945
EU 2019/947 Legally regulated
Drones in some classes required
to be equipped with secure data link
Australia
Only advice to respect private privacy
Privacy Act only applies on large organisations
Authority plans to review privacy issues with recreational drones N/A
Canada Privacy Act applies to commercial and government drones N/A
China
Not in national laws
but covered by some provincial laws (e.g., Sichuan) N/A
Colombia Not allowed to violate the rights of privacy N/A
France Operators obliged to respect privacy rights of individuals
Germany Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG, federal data protection act) applies N/A
Italy Italian Data Protection Code, enacting GDPR, applies N/A
Japan
Not linked to the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI)
but authority plans to cover privacy in next phase in the roadmap N/A
Rwanda
Operators oblighed to respect privacy rights of others
surveillance of people and property without their consent is prohibited N/A
The Netherlands Operators not allowed to violate other peoples privacy N/A
United Kingdom The Data Protection Act (DPA) applies N/A
United States Covered differently by State- or City-level laws N/A
Regulations and standards for drones are still evolving,
and privacy preservation remains an prioritised agenda.
Drone accidents may occur due to a range of reasons,
such as technical malfunction, improper operations, un-
foreseen environmental events (e.g., sudden wind gusts),
and hijacking. As more automation functionalities are
being introduced into drones, clear definitions of lia-
bilities and responsibilities for all participants involved
across the entire life cycle of a drone will need to be
explored. A closely related issue is how to enforce the
compliance of regulations for drones. The collection and
certification of digital evidence (enabled by blockchain)
on drone accidents or privacy intrusions / breaches are
also potential research topics.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article discussed blockchain-based privacy preservation
solutions for 5G-enabled drone communications, as well as
related data privacy legislation and regulations that need to be
considered in the design of these solutions. We also identified
potential challenges and open issues to inform future research
agenda that will allow the community to leverage blockchain
to facilitate privacy preservation in drone communications.
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